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Contingent Valuation of
Environmental Assets: Comparisons
with a Simulated Market
Contingent valuation' (CV) has gained credibility from comparisons2
with other value estimates including those based on travel-cost models;
costs and prices of substitutes;3 and property values.4 Such comparisons
have at least been sufficient to allay fears that CV results are dominated
by meaningless noise. In several laboratory experiments, researchers have
attempted to get people to behave strategically, yet such behavior has
been rare.' Attempts to find evidence of strategic behavior in CV studies
themselves have failed to find evidence of significant distortions. 6 Still,
there are several anomalies that have not yet been adequately explained.
First, there have been consistent differences between willingness-to-pay
and willingness-to-accept-compensation in excess of differences that are
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1. Contingent valuation employs personal and telephone interviews and mail surveys to ask people
about the values they would place on nonmarket commodities if markets did exist or other means
of payment such as taxes were in effect. That is, subjects are asked about their willingness to pay
or compensation demanded, contingent on the creation of a market or other means of payment. All
payments and receipts are purely hypothetical.
2. Knetsch & Davis, Comparison of Methodsfor RecreationalEvaluation, WATER RESEARCH
125 (A. Kneese & S. C. Smith eds. 1966); Desvouges, Smith & McGivney, A Comparison of
Alternative Approaches for Estimating Recreation and Related Benefits of Water Quality Improvements, DRAFT REPORT TO U.S. EPA (July 1982); and C. Sellar, J. Stoll & J. Chavas, Validation
of Measures of Welfare Change: A Comparison of Nonmarket Techniques, Dept. of Agricultural
Economics, Texas A & M Univ. (1982) (mimeo).
3. Thayer, Contingent Valuation Techniques for Assessing Environmental Impact: Further Evidence, 8 J. ENVIR. ECON. & MGMT. 27 (1981) and other studies discussed in Schulze, d'Arge,
& Brookshire, Valuing EnvironmentalCommodities: Some Recent Experiments, 57 LAND ECON.
151 (1981).
4. Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze, & d'Arge, Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of Survey and
HedonicApproaches, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 165 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Scherr & Babb, Pricing Public Goods: An Experiment with Two ProposedPricing
Systems, 23 PUB. CHOICE 35 (1975); Smith, The Principle of Unanimity and Voluntary Consent
in Social Choice, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1125 (1977). Marwell & Ames, Experiments on the Provision
of Public Good. 1. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free Rider Problem, 84 AM. J. SOC.
1335 (1979) and Marwell & Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision
Points, Stakes, Experience and the Free Rider Problem, 85 AM. J. SOC. 926 (1980).
6. See studies summarized in Schulze, d'Arge & Brookshire, supra note 3.
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explainable by income effects or other theoretically acceptable means.7
Second, many studies have found that substantial shares of their respondents have reacted in perverse ways to contingent valuation questions.
People refuse to answer at rates in excess of refusal rates for more conventional survey questions. When people do respond, substantial shares
seem to state values which are implausibly large or small. 8 Third, some
bidding game studies have found that responses are influenced by the
initial bid. 9 Finally, some studies have found that people give different
answers depending on information they receive. 10
In our view, these anomalies result from the fact that people confronting
a CV mechanism do not have well-developed beliefs about how they
would behave in real markets for environmental assets. Most people have
not previously attempted to express their values for nonmarket goods in
monetary terms, and contingent markets are too artificial to provide a
sufficient context for developing accurate values. As a result, substantialthough not overwhelming-inaccuracies occur in CV findings.
Our evidence to support this view comes primarily from an experiment
involving Wisconsin goose hunting permits. These permits were evaluated
using several CV mechanisms and a travel-cost model. They were also
evaluated in a "simulated market" where permittees were offered real
money not to hunt. The results show that contingent values could easily
be in error by 50 percent or more. After describing the experiment and
its results, the remainder of the paper explores the reasons for these errors
with particular emphasis on the artificiality of CV mechanisms. Several
conclusions emerge, including one particularly interesting hypothesis: Our
results and those of some other studies seem to show that CV mechanisms
tend to underestimate willingness-to-pay and overvalue environmental
assets when the criterion is willingness-to-accept-compensation.
7. Several studies with this result were cited in Meyer, Publicly Vested Values of Fish and Wildlife:
Criteria in Economic Welfare and Interface with Law, 55 LAND ECON. 223 (1979). See also, the
discussion of this phenomenon by Gordon & Knetsch, Consumer's Surplus Measures and the
Evaluation of Resources, 55 LAND ECON. 1 (1979).
8. See discussion of past studies in Mitchell & Carson, An Experiment in Determining Willingness
to Pay for National Water Quality Improvements, DRAFT REPORT TO U.S. EPA, Ch. 4 at 49-51
(June 1981).
9. Rowe, d'Arge & Brookshire, An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visibility, 7 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1980); Desvouges, Smith & McGivney, supra note 2; Mitchell and Carson,
id. Other studies, summarized in Schulze, d'Arge & Brookshire, supra note 3, were unable to
establish any effect of starting bids on final bids.
10. Some argue that changing the information may change the product being valued. See A.
Randall, J. Hoehn & G. Tolley, The Structure of Contingent Markets: Some Results of a Recent
Experiment 5-6 DEPT. OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF KY. (1981) (mimeo).
Other studies that have found probable effects of information include Rowe, d'Arge and Brookshire,
supra note 9; Daubert & Young, Recreational Demand and Maintaining in Stream Flows: A Contingent Valuation Approach, 64 AM. J. AG. ECON. 657 (1982); and Greenley, Walsh & Young,
Option Value: Empirical Evidence from a Case Study of Recreation and Water Quality, 96 Q. J.
ECON. 657 (1981).
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THE EXPERIMENT
Study Design
Permits are required to hunt Canada geese in an area of 24,600 acres
in central Wisconsin known as the Horicon Zone. The permits on which
our study focused authorized the bearer to take at most one Canada goose
in the zone between October 1 and October 15, 1978. A hunter could
legally receive only one such permit, and a total of 13,974 were issued
by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. There were no fees
charged for the permits.
A random sample of 237 permittees was drawn. Each received a randomly determined actual cash offer to give up his permit. Cash offers
ranged in roughly log-linear amounts from $1 to $200. The letter of offer
explained that the hunter should mail the researchers either the enclosed
check or his permit, postmarked no later than September 29 when the
offer would expire. A total of 221 people (94 percent) returned either
their check or their permit. On October 5, payment was stopped on the
checks that had been mailed to the remaining 16 individuals. Only one
had cashed his check ($40). In the analysis the 15 people who neither
cashed their checks nor otherwise responded were considered as having
refused their offers. For purposes of later discussion, results from this
part of the experiment will be designated SMWTS (Simulated Market
Willingness-to-Sell). Once the early season had ended, this sample of
hunters was surveyed by mail, with a response rate of 80 percent.
At the same time that the sample of hunters was drawn for the actual
cash offers, an additional sample of 353 people was drawn for a contingent
valuation survey. With an incentive of $5 per questionnaire, 94 percent
of this group responded prior to the opening of the hunting season on
October 1.
The primary contingent valuation question was worded to sound as
much like the actual cash offers as possible, except that the hypothetical
nature of the proposed transaction was emphasized. That is, the respondent was asked to suppose that a check for some fixed amount had been
included in the survey. The amount offered varied randomly from $1 to
$200 as before. Each respondent was asked to state whether he would
surrender his Horicon permit for the amount assigned to him. For purposes
of later discussion, the results of this part of the experiment will be
designated CV Take-It-Or-Leave-It WTS.
A later question asked the subject to imagine that he had not received
a Horicon permit, a plausible circumstance since permittees are drawn
by lottery when the number of applicants exceeds the number of permits
available. But in this case, each respondent was asked whether he would
purchase a permit for a given specified price, again between $1 and $200,
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if it were possible to do so. The results here will be designated CV TakeIt-Or-Leave-It WTP.
The same survey included four other CV questions. Two followed the
"open-ended" format which allowed the respondent to fill in his maximum
willingness-to-pay and minimum willingness-to-accept-compensation.
Results here will be designated CV Open-Ended WTP and CV OpenEnded WTS, respectively. The third described the cost of several recreational alternatives and asked what the respondent thought would be a
reasonable price for a goose hunting permit. Results here will be termed
CV Reasonable Price. The fourth CV question asked the respondent to
state the minimum amount he would have to be paid before he would
work rather than hunt geese. The results from this question will be designated as CV Willingness-To-Forego-A-Day's-Pay.
A third sample, this one consisting of 300 individuals, was drawn prior
to the 1978 hunting season. This sample was surveyed by mail after the
hunting season to develop data for a travel-cost demand estimate. A
response rate of 91 percent was achieved, even without a monetary incentive for returning the questionnaire. The estimated value of a permit
based on the travel-cost data will be referred to as TCWTP.
The surveys of all three samples asked essentially the same questions.
In addition to the usual socioeconomic variables, these questions covered
years of hunting experience, commitment to goose hunting, attitudes
toward monetary valuation of hunting, hunting equipment owned, attitudes towards goose management in the Horicon Zone, and the like.
Statistically significant differences between the three samples were very
rare and none appeared to be sufficient to affect comparisons.
Analysis
The response to the take-it-or-leave-it offers in both the simulated and
contingent markets were the most difficult to analyze, because they involved dichotomous (yes or no) answers. As a first step, the data were
analyzed using a logit model" of the form
r i = (1 + e Oyi) -l
where iT i is the probability that the ith hunter will accept an offer to sell
his permit or buy one (depending on which part of the experiment is
being analyzed); Yi is a vector of explanatory variables for the ith hunter;
and 3 is a vector of regression coefficients. In Model 1, shown in Table
1, only a single explanatory variable, the natural logarithm of the offei
amount (In Dollars), was used, and the coefficients were estimated by
11. Excellent expositions on the problem of dichotomous dependent variables and the logit model
are presented in R. PINDYK & D. RUBENFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND ECONOMETRIC FORECASTS 632 (1976) and H. THEIL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMETRICS 247 (1971).
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TABLE 1
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SIMULATED AND CONTINGENT
MARKETS FOR WILLINGNESS-TO-SELLa
Model I
Explanatory
Variables
Constant
In Dollars

Simulated

Model 2
Contingent

Simulated

3.99**
(.66)

3.24**
(.54)

1.72
(.98)

- 1.18**
(.18)

-. 74**
(.13)

- 1.16"*
(.18)

-. 84**
(.14)

.21"*
(.07)

.40**
(.07)

Commitment
N

189

306

189

Contingent
- .58
(.81)

306

'Standard errors are given in parentheses.

"Indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at .01 level.

the maximum likelihood method for willingness to sell in both the contingent and simulated markets. The constants and the coefficients for both
markets are significantly different than zero at the .01 level. However, it
is particularly noteworthy that the coefficient on In Dollars is much larger
in absolute value in the simulated market, indicating that changes in dollar
amounts have a stronger effect there. Likelihood ratio tests indicated
satisfactory fits in both cases and chi-squared tests indicated that the
overall equations were significantly different at the .05 level.
The variable tri is interpreted as the probability that a randomly selected
hunter will agree to sell his permit as a function of the dollar amount
offered. As the second step in the valuation process, these probabilities
were used to estimate the expected value of a permit. This was $63 for
the simulated market and $101 for the contingent market. These numbers
reflect a stronger positive effect of increasing the dollar amount on the
probability of selling in the simulated market. They also depend on the
fact that the models were truncated at the upper limit of the data, $200.
Including additional independent variables in the model produced some
additional results of interest. One was that the coefficient on income was
consistently small and insignificant. Secondly, several attitude scales were
included in an attempt to explain differences in behavior in simulated and
contingent markets. An important instance is Model 2 in Table 1, where
a variable reflecting commitment to goose hunting was added. "Commitment" aggregated responses to four related items on the questionnaire,
using standard social psychological procedures for attitude measurement.
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Its expected sign is positive for willingness to sell, indicating that the
more committed a hunter is, the less likely he is to agree to sell at any
given price. Commitment has the expected sign in both markets and its
coefficient is significant at the .01 level in both. However, the coefficient
is about twice as large in the contingent market, indicating that it has a
much stronger downward influence on the probability of selling when
hypothetical dollars are offered than when the dollars are real. This is a
result that will prove important in our interpretation of the experiment
presented below.
Turning to the willingness-to-pay side, legal constraints on transfer of
hunting permits made infeasible a simulated market where hunters could
actually buy hunting permits. As a not altogether satisfactory substitute,
we propose to apply economic theory to the simulated market experiment
results. Consumer theory indicates that maximum willingness-to-pay and
minimum willingness-to-accept compensation for any given commodity
will be equal except for the income effect. 12 However, the simulated
market for goose hunting permits could show no significant effect of
income on the decision of whether or not to sell. Thus, willingness-topay and willingness-to-sell should be approximately equal for the bulk
of the hunters. In probabilistic terms this means that the probability that
a randomly selected hunter would buy a permit at a given price is equal
to unity minus the probability that he would sell at that price. This has
interesting mathematical implications. Letting *i = the probability that
the ith hunter will buy at a given price,
=

=1

1

-

Ir

1
1+e W3Yi
1+e -Yi

That is, the coefficients for 4ij are the same as those for rri, except that
the signs are reversed. In Table 2, the first column of numbers is designated as simulated market results, but it does not contain values from
a separate simulated market test of willingness-to-pay. Rather, it includes
the coefficients of Model 1, Table 1, with signs reversed.
The contingent market, on the other hand, provided direct evidence
on willingness-to-pay in the form of responses to hypothetical take-it-orleave-it offers. These were analyzed in the usual fashion, with coefficients
reported in Table 2. Both the constant and the coefficient on InDollars
are significant at the .01 level, and a likelihood ratio test indicated a
12. See Willig, Consumer Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 589 (1976).
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SIMULATED AND CONTINGENT
MARKETS FOR WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY
Model 3
Explanatory
Variables
Constant
In Dollars

Simulated

Contingent

- 3.99**
(.66)

1.97**
(.51)

1.18**
(.18)

1.22**
(.17)

**Indicates significance at the .01 level.

satisfactory fit. For future reference note the striking similarity of the
coefficients on In Dollars in the simulated and contingent markets. Formal
confirmation was provided by a failure to reject, at the .05 level, the null
hypothesis that these coefficients were equal. This result proved robust
across various other specifications of the model and existed despite the
fact that chi-squared tests of the null hypothesis that all coefficients were
the same were consistently rejected.
After truncating the model at $200, the expected value of a permit was
estimated to be $21. As in the case of WTS, we attempted several multivariate models, but with less success. Income again proved insignificant,
and none of the attitudinal variables was significant at the .05 level.
Analysis of the open-ended measures, including WTS, WTP, the rea3onable price and willingness-to-forego-a-day's-pay, was much more
;traightforward. The only major issue was how to treat refusals to answer
and extremely high or low values. For purposes of this analysis, all
.efusals and zero responses were ignored. All responses in excess of $200
were set at $200 to facilitate comparisons with the results of the take-it)r-leave-it offers. Then, simple means were calculated. Open-ended willngness-to-pay was $11; open-ended willingness-to-sell was $68; willngness-to-forego-a-day's pay was $67; and the reasonable price was $11.
The travel-cost model involved the definition of eleven concentric zones
)f origin around the Horicon Zone. 3 Travel costs included the variable
13. It must be acknowledged* that most practitioners of the travel-cost method now prefer to
lisaggregate to the individual level, rather than using the more traditional zonal approach. See Brown
k Nawas, Impact of Aggregation on the Estimation of Outdoor Recreation DemandFunctions, 55
kM. J. AG. ECON. 246 (1973). However, goose hunters were not free to choose the number of
iunting visits they would make to the Horicon Zone. Once one goose was taken, the individual
iunter could no longer hunt Canada geese there until the next year. This severely constrained the
tumber of trips for each individual, and a model based on individual observations was not successful.
fence, a zonal model was applied.
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costs of transportation (i.e., gas, oil, tires, and repairs) for various classes
of vehicles as reported by the U.S. Department of Transportation 4 plus
an imputed value of travel time at 50 percent of the hourly income rate,
following procedures advocated by Cesario.15 The proportion of vehicles
in each size class was estimated from survey data. Average distances and
travel times from the zones of origin were based on data provided by the
Wisconsin Department of Transportation. Survey results indicated that
nearly all the goose hunting trips involved day trips only, so that allowances for overnight costs were not required. We also learned that the most
common substitute for goose hunting is duck hunting. Since duck hunting
is widely available in Wisconsin, it was determined that substitute prices
could be deleted from the model without great concerns about omitted
variable bias.
After trying various functional forms, the following equation was chosen as fitting the data best:

where

Vj = - .67 + 84.9 (TCj) (.45)
(9.2)
Vj = hunting visits per thousand population from the jth
zone, found by expanding sample values to the
population.
TCj = the travel cost from the jth zone, including an imputed value for travel time.

These coefficients were estimated using weighted least squares to correct
for the inherent heteroskedasticity of zonal models. 16 The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors and indicate that the coefficient on travel
costs is significant at the .01 level. Inclusion of attitudinal variables and
income produced no additional results worth mentioning, with aggregation being an obvious potential problem.
Points on the estimated demand function were then calculated by multiplying each Vj by the zonal population. The area under the demand
curve was slightly over $450,000 or $32 per permit.
Summary of Value Results
Table 3 summarizes the value estimates. It shows that CV estimates
range from $11 to $101. While these results are "in the same ballpark,"
the differences are still striking. Furthermore, if the simulated market and
travel-cost results are used as rough standards for comparison, it is clear
14. U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., COST OF OWNING AND OPERATING AN AUTOMOBILE
(1976).
15. Cesario, Value of Time in Recreation Benefit Studies, 52 LAND ECON. 32 (1976).
16. See Bowes & Loomis, A Note on the Use of Travel Cost Models with Unequal Zonal Populations, 56 LAND ECON. 465 (1980).
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TABLE 3
VALUES OF A PERMIT ARRANGED IN DESCENDING ORDERa
CV
CV
CV
SM
TC
CV
CV
CV
'Definitions:
CV =
SM =
TC =
WTS =
WTP =

Take-lt-Or-Leave-lt-WTS
Open-Ended WTS
Willingness-To-Forego-A-Day's-Pay
WTS
WTP
Take-It-Or-Leave-It WTS
Open-Ended WTP
Reasonable Price

$101
$ 68
$ 67
$ 63
$ 32
$ 21
$ 11
$ 11

Contingent Market Value
Simulated Market Value
Travel-Cost Value
Willingness-to-Sell (accept compensation)
Willingness-to-Pay

that some of the CV results contain substantial errors. Simulated market
and contingent market take-it-or-leave-it willingness-to-sell are the most
comparable because of their parallel construction. Here CV appears to
have overestimated the value of a permit by 60 percent. While CV OpenEnded WTS and Willingness-to-Forego-A-Day's-Pay come out much closer
to the simulated market value, there are problems with interpretation
which will be discussed in the next section. Whether the simulated market
or travel cost estimate is used as the standard, the CV willingness-to-pay
measures appear to underestimate substantially the value of a permit.
Further examination of the results may help to identify the reasons for
these differences.
HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN CONTINGENT MARKETS
The Central Role of Artificiality
In attempting to understand human behavior in CV studies, the artificiality of the social context is particularly interesting. Prior to being
confronted by an interviewer or mail survey, subjects may never before
have attempted to express how they feel about environmental assets in
monetary terms. While constrained utility maximization is a useful construct, conversion of utility into monetary terms in the real world may
involve repeated market transactions over time, consultation within peer
groups, assessment of the markets for complements and substitutes, consultations within the household, and references to consumer information.
It is questionable whether the interviewer or questionnaire designer can
fully compensate for the lack of such experience and information in the
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limited time and space available. Hence, subjects are forced to deal with
a situation which seems quite artificial from their point of view in comparison to situations where they normally arrive at monetary values. While
the researcher hopes they will follow the same mental processes they
would use in real markets, the social context within which contingent
valuation occurs may be so artificial that people will be unwilling or
unable to do so.
That artificiality plays a dominant role is consistent with the anomalies
noted in the introduction. When people are not clear in their own minds
about how they would behave in a real market, a logical reaction is to
refuse to answer CV questions, particularly in a mail survey where refusal
does not entail an uncomfortable face-to-face confrontation with an interviewer. Other respondents may react by stating zero willingness to pay
or by setting implausibly high (even infinite) requirements for compensation. Responses are likely to be sensitive to information which economic
theory indicates ought to be irrelevant. Information provides a place to
anchor responses. We also suspect that the large differences between CV
willingness-to-pay and CV willingness-to-accept common in so many
studies are rooted in the artificiality of contingent markets. To see how,
let us return to the goose hunter experiment.
Relevant Results from the Goose Hunter Experiment and Other Studies
Since the simulated market involved actual money in exchange for
actual goose hunting opportunities, it was less artificial than the contingent
market. Thus, the resulting behavior ought to be closer to what would
happen in a real market. Model 1 indicated that increasing the dollar
amount increased the probability of selling in both markets. That coefficients were quite significant and consistent in sign with expectations is
encouraging. It means that the responses in this type of contingent market
were not composed of mere noise. But people responded more strongly
to real than to hypothetical dollars, forcing CV Take-It-Or-Leave-It WTS
($101) to exceed substantially the comparable simulated market figure
($63). One has to wonder why.
Differences in the impact of commitment seem to point the way to at
least a partial answer. While dollars had a weaker effect in the contingent
market, commitment had a stronger effect. The stimulus of real dollars,
which the subject can actually spend, is simply more powerful than the
hypothetical dollars presented in a questionnaire. In the latter case, other
variables such as commitment played a larger role in the decision. Additional analysis-not presented here to save space-showed that opposition to monetary valuation of wildlife and the importance of hunting as
a social activity also influenced behavior in the contingent market, but

July 1983]

VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSETS

not in the simulated market. In plain words, "money talks" and real
money "speaks louder" than hypothetical money.
Additional evidence along these lines can be drawn from informal
observations during the experiment. People seemed to give the actual
cash offers much more serious consideration. With the $5 incentive, the
response to the CV survey was very swift. People were spending a couple
of hours on the survey and then returning it promptly to meet the deadline.
Because the response rate for the actual cash offers was much slower,
we called about 15 of the subjects to determine why and found that most
were holding back their responses to give the offer more thought.
One resulting hypothesis worth future investigation is that people respond as they do to contingent markets because of uncertainty. This may
lead them to state answers which imply conservatively high requirements
for compensation, amounts at which they are relatively certain they really
would sell. They could even recognize the possibility that they might sell
at lower amounts, but still give conservative answers in order to "play
it safe." After all, they would not want to tell people from the government
or the university that they would sell at a given price if they might not.
The result would be an upward bias in CV willingness-to-sell. A real
market (or even a simulated market) gives people stronger incentives to
thoroughly explore their preferences and constraints.
Our argument here has much in common with what the literature has
termed "hypothetical bias." ' 17 However, to the extent that they exist in
reality, information bias, starting point bias, vehicle bias, instrument bias,
and item non-response bias,"8 as well as hypothetical bias, are closely
related. All stem from the artificiality of contingent markets. Also, we
agree with Randall, Hoehn and Brookshire 9 that the term "bias" has
sometimes been used too loosely in the earlier literature. Random error
alone is not sufficient to establish a bias. Evidence from our experiment
does seem to indicate that, ceteris paribus, CV mechanisms tend to
overestimate willingness to sell, but they also show that other things may
not be equal.
In particular, the open-ended WTS figure of $68 seems at first glance
to contradict our argument. However, there may have been a countervailing bias here. About 4.6 percent of those returning the questionnaire
left this item blank and 25.8 percent indicated zero. Those responses
contrast sharply with the simulated market where none of the 31 indi17. This term dates back at least to Rowe, d'Arge & Brookshire, supra note 9 at 6. See also
Thayer, supra note 3, at 32 and Schulze, d'Arge & Brookshire, supra note 3, at 148.
18. Item nonresponse bias is discussed in Mitchell & Carson, supra note 8, at Ch. 4 at 49. Other
biases are defined in Schulze, d'Arge & Brookshire, supra note 3, at 155-59.
19. Randall, Hoehn, & Brookshire, Contingent Valuation Survey for Evaluating Environmental
Assets, 23 NAT. RES. J. 635 (1983).
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viduals offered $1 sold and only 10 percent of the 29 people offered $5
sold. It therefore seems unlikely that 26 percent of those in the CV sample
would give their permits away free. An alternative interpretation would
be that substantial numbers of these people meant to say that their permits
were "not for sale." If our upper limit of $200 is substituted for all zeros
(but not for the blanks) the mean increases to $99.
As another measure of willingness-to-accept-compensation, the OpenEnded-Willingness-To-Forego-A-Day's-Pay at $67 was also interesting.
This must be interpreted with care, however, because it is a value per
day, while the other values are per permit. On the average, permittees
hunted two different days, but each "day" actually involved only about
half a day of hunting, since hunting is best in the morning. Presumably
some hunters who participate at the average rate would only miss one
full eight hour day of work, but this would be infeasible for those who
have to travel longer distances. Interpretation of the result is further
clouded by not knowing whether those who hunt on more than one day
regard this as a benefit of holding the permit or as a cost of having poor
luck on earlier trips. Item non-response problems and zero answers may
have caused difficulty here as well. Slightly less than 6 percent refused
to answer the question, 13 percent put zero, and 7 percent indicated that
they would not take off work regardless of the wage rate. It is also worth
noting that despite the similarities in mean values between this measure
and the CV Open-Ended WTS, the correlation between the two measures
was 0.17, indicating that respondents do not consider them to be identical
questions. Still, questions of this type deserve additional research.
Turning to the willingness-to-pay side, it must be reemphasized that
simulated market WTP was impossible to obtain as part of our experiment.
Still, there are two benchmarks for comparison to CV results. The first
is $63, based on the theoretical argument made previously for equality
between willingness-to-pay and williness-to-accept. The second is the
travel cost value of $32. By both standards, all three contingent WTP
measures (which range between $11 and $21) appear to be low. Furthermore, the logit analysis of the take-it-or-leave-it responses may have
been somewhat misleading in indicating $21. The raw data show a rapid
decline in positive responses as the proposed price of permits increases:
88 percent at $1, 64 percent at $5, 30 percent at $10, 19 percent at $20,
and only an occasional acceptance at prices greater than $20. Had the
occasional outlier at higher amounts been deleted, CV Take-It-Or-LeaveIt WTP would have been substantially less than $21. Comparisons with
the simulated market value and the travel-cost estimate would lead one
to conclude that our CV mechanisms underestimated true willingness to
pay by a substantial amount.
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Some other studies can be cited for further support. Knetsch and Davis20
arrived at roughly comparable amounts from a CVWTP measure and a
travel-cost model. However, had their travel-cost model contained any
substantial allowance for the value of travel time-as most investigators
now agree is essential-their travel-cost estimate would probably have
been much higher. Sellar, Stoll and Chavas 2' also compared travel-cost
and CV estimates. They found travel-cost estimates were roughly of the
same magnitude as CV estimates using a logit framework comparable to
ours, while an open-ended willingness-to-pay format produced much lower
results. Again there was no allowance for the value of travel time. A
study by Brookshire 22 compared CV willingness-to-pay for air quality
improvements in the Los Angeles Basin with property value differentials.
Theory would lead one to expect actual willingness-to-pay to be less than
property value differences since people willing to pay more could move.
The comparisons were consistent with this expectation, with CV estimates
substantially lower. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that
CVWTP values are biased downward, although not constituting positive
evidence per se.
Our experiment does not clearly indicate what forces lead to this apparent bias. We did try including commitment and a host of other attitudinal and socioeconomic variables in the logit equation but nothing
seemed to help predict the probability of buying. The result that the
coefficients on In Dollars in both equations are not significantly different
suggests that changing the dollar amount had similar effects in both types
of markets. 23 The bias appears to be "across the board." We suspect that
people used the contingent market as a forum for telling us that they do
not wish to pay very much for anything they were currently getting free.
Uncertainty may also have played a role. The conservatism that we previously hypothesized would cause people to overstate willingness-to-sell
might also cause people to understate willingness-to-pay.
That the CV Reasonable Price and CV Open-Ended WTP produced
identical means of $11 may be significant. One might suppose that most
people's "reasonable price" would be less than their maximum willingness-to-pay, but this difference did not show up on our CV survey. Perhaps
people answer Open-Ended WTP questions with amounts they would not
mind paying, rather than their maximums. However, even this seemingly
20. Supra note 2.
21. Supra note 2.
22. Supra note 4.
23. This does not mean that the logit functions are parallel, however. Differentiation of the logit
equation quickly shows that its slope is a function of both the constant and the coefficient on In
Dollars.
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obvious interpretation is clouded by the fact that the responses of the
subjects to the two measures are correlated only at 0.2 (significant at .01
level). Surely, if people were simply giving us their reasonable price
instead of maximum WTP, the correlation would be higher. Also, item
nonresponse and zero-response problems may have affected the results.
For Open-Ended WTP, 31 percent answered zero or put down no answer.
For the Reasonable Price, the figure was 18 percent.
CONCLUSIONS
First let us reemphasize that our contingent valuation mechanisms seemed
to produce meaningful-albeit inaccurate--economic information. In the
take-it-or-leave-it cases the price variable was the only one that was
always significant in predicting both CVWTS and CVWTP. The direction
of the relationship between In Dollars and the probability of acceptance
always had the expected sign and were always significantly different than
zero at the .01 level. In a world where public policy would otherwise be
made in total ignorance of the economic values of environmental assets,
such contingent values may be useful.
Still, our results by no means justify complacency about the accuracy
of CV techniques. Hunters valued the permits between $11 and $101
depending on the mechanism. That is no small difference. We fear that
too many previous studies have used only one or two techniques and
justified the results by suggesting that they were "reasonable." Had we
done so for goose hunting permits, $11 would have seemed "reasonable,"
yet comparisons with our simulated market and travel-cost estimates indicate that the true value could be larger by a factor of three to six! Notice
that this occurs even though goose permits are already a well-defined
commodity in consumers' minds and can be associated with monetary
values through hunting stamp and license fees and charges for access to
private land. In cases involving more vaguely defined changes in environmental quality, the added degree of artificiality could well lead to
larger inaccuracies.
Perhaps other CV techniques would have been more accurate than
those we used. Our work required techniques amenable to mail surveys.
Some would argue that personal interviews yield more accurate results
because of greater flexibility in the amount and nature of the information
that can be provided to subjects and because of opportunities for iterative
bidding. Interviews may indeed provide opportunities to help subjects
more fully explore preferences and constraints in order to predict more
accurately how they would behave in real markets. Our concern is that
such interview procedures would be superimposed on inherently artificial
contingent markets. Doing so may cause subjects to base answers even
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more on the information received and other aspects of the interview
situation and less on the relevant economic parameters. Only further
empirical work can determine which basic approach is correct.
Thus, we conclude with a plea for further research. All papers such
as this are prone to engage in such pleas, but our case is a special one.
Contingent valuation has to involve some of the most difficult measurement problems ever faced by economics. At the same time, the stakes
are high. Nonmarket environmental assets are under ever increasing economic pressure, and things with unknown economic values tend to be
assigned zero or very low economic values in public decision processes.
If this void is to be filled with credible economic information, much more
needs to be known about when CV techniques will work well and when
they will not; the extent to which CV willingness-to-pay measures in
general have a tendency toward downward bias and CV willingness-toaccept measures, an upward bias; whether such biases-to the extent that
they exist-stem from respondent uncertainty or other forces; which CV
techniques work best and why; and a host of related questions. Dealing
with these issues will require research of high quality that looks beyond
the normal boundaries of economics to its sister social sciences. More
research has great potential to help minimize errors in CV results and to
properly interpret them in environmental decision making.

